Alma Glenn Pratt v. Board of Education of the Uintah County School District : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Alma Glenn Pratt v. Board of Education of the
Uintah County School District : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Merlin R. Lybbert; George A. Hunt; Worlsey, Snow and Christensen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Michael T. McCoy; Attorney for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation












^ W LIBRARY 
2 4 JUN.1977 
WHAM VOUNG t v - i V i i a m 
*M2aC2ait law Scfc^ 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs, Case No. 14469 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert, Esq. and 
George A. Hunt, Esq. 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant-Petitioner 
Michael T. McCoy, Esq. 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
t 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE No. 14469 
DINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Appellant above-named hereby petitions this Court for a re-
hearing of the appeal in this cause. 
This petition is made on the grounds and for the reason 
that the majority opinion of this court filed May 4, 1977, 
failed to take into account the existence of a stipulation 
of counsel entered into upon the record and in the presence 
of the Court prior to the trial of this case, which stipu-
lation was dispositive of two crucial issues. 
The stipulation provided: first, that Plaintiff had 
not intended nor attempted to comply with the notice pro-
visions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act nor to proceed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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thereunder; second, that Plaintiff v/as not making any claim 
under the provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act. 
Appellant, in reliance thereon, did not present any evi-
dence at trial in defense of previous claims asserted by 
Plaintiff under those Acts. 
This petition is supported by the Brief of Appellant 
filed herewith. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 1977. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
fl^Ld 
George A. tjtjnt 
Attorneys for" Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing on Michael T. McCoy, Esq., 414 Walker 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 24th day of 
May, 1977. 
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STATUS OF THE CASE 
The appeal in this action was filed February 11, 1976. 
The issues were briefed and the matter was argued before 
this Court on October 12, 1976. At that time. Justice Hall 
was not a member of this Court. The opinion of this Court 
was filed on May 4, 1977. The decision was split with 
Justice Maughan writing the majority opinion which was 
signed by Justices Wilkins and Hall. A vigorous dissent was 
written by Justice Ellett and concurred in by Justice Crockett. 
The petition for re-hearing was timely filed by Appellant on 
May 24, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAJORITY OPINION FAILS TO TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT THE EXISTENCE OF A STIPULATION 
OF COUNSEL ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO TRIAL, 
WHICH WAS DISPOSITIVE OF TWO CRUCIAL 
ISSUES IN THE CASE. 
Immediately prior to the trial of this case counsel for 
the parties entered into a stipulation on the record. The 
stipulation which was entered into in the presence of the 
» 
Court is as follows: 
The Court: 
Now Mr. Lybbert, you had a matter that 
you asked Mr. Dibblee to stipulate re-
garding , and Mr. Dibblee indicated that 
he didnft see any reason why not—go 
ahead. 
-2-
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Mr. Lybbert: 
I understand that the plaintiff is 
willing to stipulate that they have 
not proceeded or intended to proceed 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act and have not attempted nor have 
they complied with the notice provi-
sions of that act. 
Mr. Dibblee: 
I understand that's correct. 
Mr. Lybbert: 
No. 2: I understand from our previous 
conversation that you are not making 
any claim under the provisions of the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Pro-
cedures Act, Section 53-51-1, et seq. 
Mr. Dibblee: 
That's correct. 
It is also quoted by Justice Ellett at page 2 of his 
dissenting opinion. The stipulation as it appears in the 
record was never withdrawn nor repudiated by Respondent or 
his counsel. There has never been so much as a suggestion 
either in the trial transcript, at post-trial hearings, in 
the Respondent's brief on appeal or in the arguments before 
tJlis Court, that the stipulation did not accurately set forth 
±he agreement of the parties. Neither the trial court nor 
the majority opinion of this Court has pointed to any legal 
reason why it should not be given its intended effect. Rather, 
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its existence is ignored. The stipulation was an acknowledg-
ment by the Respondent that he had not intended nor attempted 
to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Further, he acknowledged that he did not in-
tend to proceed under that Act. The Respondent also unequi-
vocally stated that he was not making any claim under the 
provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act. The applicability of certain provisions of these 
statutes had previously been in dispute between the parties. 
It has long been the law of Utah that parties and 
their counsel can stipulate as to issues and evidence and 
that such a stipulation is binding on all parties and the 
court. Taylor v. Murray, 232 P.2d 367, 371 (Utah, 1951). 
See also, 83 C.J.S. Stipulations, §13 (1953, as amended); 
73 Am.Jur.2d, Stipulations, §8 (1974). 
In its majority opinion, this Court ruled that, with 
respect to the Notice of Claim required by §63-30-13, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended), the same was timely given 
since it was filed within 90 days after the bearing given 
to Respondent in September of 1975. This court apparently 
presumed that Respondent was entitled to a hearing under 
the provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination Pro-
cedures Act. Here lies the rub. Prior to the trial in 
-A-
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I 
i 
this case a significant factual issue existed over the 
actual date upon which Respondent was terminated. The 
dispute was recognized by this Court in the majority 
opinion where it is noted: "The parties disagreed as to 
whether the date plaintiff was so notified was April 27 
or May 11, 1973." This date is so important because if in 
fact Respondent was terminated on April 27, 1973, then he was 
terminated prior to the effective date of the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act (May 10, 1973) and there-
fore is not entitled to a hearing at all. Even the Respondent 
recognized this in entering into the stipulation. 
Since the stipulation prior to trial removed from issue , 
application of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act, Appellant did not adduce any evidence on the question 
respecting date of termination. Had that question been in i 
issue, Respondent would have presented considerable evidence, 
both oral and documentary on that point. From that evidence 
the jury could have found that Appellant was terminated on « 
April 27, 1973, and was therefore not entitled to any bene-
fits of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act. 
Consequently, his claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act would had to have been filed within 90 days of that date. 
But even that is not an issue. The Respondent was forthright 
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in acknowledging in the stipulation that he had not complied 
with the 90 day notice provision, nor had he ever intended to. 
Effectively, the majority opinion revives issues put to 
rest by the stipulation of counsel and finds facts relating 
to those issues. The prevailing opinion not only denies the 
Appellant the benefits of the stipulation, but even assuming 
the resurrected issues are valid, this Court has made findings 
of fact adverse to the School District even though it has never 
been afforded an opportunity to present evidence on those 
issues. This constitutes a blantant denial of due process. 
The opinion overrules, sub silentio, the law of Taylor v. 
Murray, supra, and casts doubt concerning the validity of every 
stipulation entered into by counsel. 
All during the preparation of this case for trial Respon-
dent contended that, as a matter of law, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act did not apply to the facts of this case. It was 
for that reason that his counsel stipulated that no attempt 
had been made to comply with the notice and claim provisions 
of that Act. Since this court has ruled that the Act does 
apply to this case, Appellant is entitled to judgment in 
its favor, or, if for some undisclosed legal reason the 
stipulation of the parties is invalid, at the very least, a 
new trial to present evidence on issues which the stipulation 
by its terms laid to rest. 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to vacate its 
majority opinion of May 4, 1977 and enter an order reversing 
the decision of the court below, or, in the alternative, for 
its Order granting a new trial if it is found the stipulation 
is invalid. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May, 1977. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
By. ^.^Ld 
George A. Euht 
Attorneys for Respondent-Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
Brief to Michael T. McCoy, Esq., 414 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 24th day of May, 1977. 
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